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Prepayment Health Care Plan Enabling Acts-Are
Their Restrictive Features Constitutional?
INTRODUCTION
Illness is something which afflicts the rich as well as the poor, the
affluent as well as the downtrodden. It does not choose its host accord-
ing to social position, educational background, or economic status. In
this century the medical sciences and the medical professions have
minimized the hazards of illness. Yet the costs of preventing or curing
illness, and the financial burden placed upon the victim, persists and
grows.
To alleviate this financial burden, we have witnessed the passage of
Medicare and its benefits. But Medicare is of a limited scope. It is not
intended to have a wholesale effect on society. It is not aimed at those
individuals and their families who fit into the social rank nebulously
characterized as the "Middle Class." These individuals face a financial
burden, although not unbearable, in preserving their health.
At this juncture it should be observed that certain health insurance
and Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans are available to dilute this bur-
den. Although these plans have existed for sometime and have been
helpful in meeting this problem, they have not solved the problem. It is
with one of these types of solutions, namely the Blue Shield type, that
this paper deals.
Blue Shield plans, more broadly stated, are prepayment health care
plans whereby the individual makes a small, periodic payment to a
trust, cooperative association, or nonprofit corporation in return for
health care services. These services are provided for by a panel or group
of health care providers (e.g., physicians, optometrists, dentists), or by
the individual's health care provider, who have contracted with the
trust, cooperative or nonprofit corporation to provide such services to
its subscribing members. The participating health care providers are
ordinarily compensated on a salary or per capita basis whenever a
panel or group is used, and by a fee-for-service system whenever the
individual chooses his own health care provider.' The concept of pay-
ing for health services by means of small periodic prepayments is an
1. H. HANSEN, LEGAL RIGHTs OF GRoup HEALTH PLANS (1964); Hansen, Group Health
Plans-A Twenty-Year Legal Review, 42 MINN. L. REv. 527, 528 n.5 (1958).
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excellent method of meeting the financial problems attendant to an ill-
ness since there is an amortization of the burden.
Most jurisdictions have, however, enacted enabling acts for these pre-
payment health care plans which restrict the sponsorship and control of
the plans to the medical profession. As such, competition among differ-
ent plans is prevented since, in most instances, only one prepayment
health service plan exists within the jurisdiction or within a particular
area within the jurisdiction. The medical professions have, in effect,
acquired a monopoly over this type of plan. Although the rates charged
subscribers under these plans are generally regulated by an insurance
commissioner, the lack of competition coupled with the retention of the
fee-for-service method of paying professional persons maintains a higher
cost to the consumer without any countervailing reason for such a sys-
tem existing. There is no real or apparent danger in having consumers
or lay individuals control the financial aspects of these plans, and noth-
ing can be found to substantiate the reason why the professional per-
sonnel or the professional societies should have control over this aspect
of the plan. Physicians, dentist, optometrists, etc., are educated and
trained to provide health services; they are not educated to deal with
financial matters. It is the object of this inquiry to examine the mo-
nopolistic control over the financial aspects of these prepayment plans
to determine their validity in light of the constitutional standards of
due process and the prohibition against delegation of authority to a
private body.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the 1930's, the need for greater quantitative and qualitative health
services for the American people, especially those people in the lower
income groups, became a matter of national importance.2 One of the
consequences of this awareness of needed health services was the crea-
tion of prepaid health service plans. Among the earliest of these plans
were the lay sponsored and lay controlled service plans.3 The fact that
these plans were lay sponsored and lay controlled to a great extent
prompted the medical societies to pressure the state legislatures, within
whose purview the power to regulate public health is found, for legis-
2. See generally, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE COST OF MEDICAL CARE FOR THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 172 (1932); Hansen, Laws Affecting Group Health Plans, 35 IOWA L.
REV. 209 (1950); Holman and Cooley, Voluntary Health Insurance in the United States,
35 IOWA L. REv. 183 (1950).
3. F. GOLDMAN, VOLUNTARY MEDICAL CARE INSURANCE 148-9 (1948); SERBEIN, PAYING FOR
MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 157-161, 164, 224 (1953).
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lation restricting the sponsorship and control of such prepaid health
plans to the medical profession. 4 The initial success of the medical
societies was tremendous, and within a short period of time they ac-
quired enabling legislation in a number of states restricting these pre-
paid health service plans to medical profession sponsorship and control. 5
It must also be mentioned at this point that the medical societies did
not restrict their oppositional tactics to pressuring state legislatures for
restrictive enabling legislation. The medical societies also imposed
"ethical" sanctions to restrain or prohibit lay controlled plans from
acquiring the necessary panels or groups of physicians to service these
plans. The primary "ethical" principles used were those principles
requiring "free choice of physician" and adherence to the "fee-for-
service" system. 6 Although recently the medical societies, particularly
the American Medical Association, have reviewed and liberalized their
earlier positions, 7 the medical societies have not yet completely accepted
the lay controlled health service plan as an ethical program for provid-
ing medical services.
The disciplinary actions based on principles of ethics which the med-
ical societies have utilized against physicians participating in these
health service plans have not always been accompanied by legal
sanction. Two cases of particular importance exemplify this posi-
tion. In American Medical Association v. United States,8 the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of the American Med-
ical Association and the district medical society for violating Section 3
of the Sherman Act. Section 3 of the Sherman Act prohibits combina-
tion or conspiracies in restraint of trade within the District of Columbia.
The medical societies were held to have violated this section by coercing
physicians not to accept employment from a group health membership
corporation providing a prepayment health care plan, by restraining
medical association members from consulting with the corporation's
physicians and by restraining hospitals in the District of Columbia
from affording facilities to the corporation's physicians and patients.
The Supreme Court of Washington, in Group Health Cooperative of
4. Hansen, supra note 2, at 222; Hansen, supra note I, at 531.
5. These plans became known as "Blue Shield" plans, a sequel to the earlier hospital
service plans denominated as "Blue Cross" plans. For a listing of the state enabling acts
see, Hansen, supra note 1, at 224 n.52; Hansen, supra note 2, at 531-32 n.13.
6. See, Standards of Acceptance of Medical Care Plans in AMA, VOLUNTARY PREPAY-
MENT MEDICAL BENEFIT PLANS, 148-150 (1953).
7. See generally, Report of the Commission on Medical Care Plans, J.A.M.A., Jan. 17,
1959 (special issue), often referred to as the Larson Report.
8. 317 U.S. 519 (1943), aff'g 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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Puget Sound v. King County Medical Society,9 held that the local
county medical society's disciplinary actions aimed at physicians operat-
ing or desiring to join a certain prepayment health plan had violated
the State Constitutional provision prohibiting combination or agree-
ments to fix prices or to limit the production of a commodity, namely,
medical services. 10 Notwithstanding these decisions, as well as a report
by the American Medical Association warning local medical societies
of the legal dangers inherent in such disciplinary actions," there is
some evidence that such activities are still being pursued by some local
societies, although apparently not to the extent previously under-
taken.' 2
While the above mentioned activities proved to be the most formid-
able obstacles to lay conduct of prepaid health service plans, they were
not the only obstacles to such plans. The common law corporate prac-
tice rule and the possible application of the state insurance laws also
presented difficulties for the operation of such lay sponsored plans.
The common law corporate practice rule prohibits a corporation
from practicing as a profession (in this case the healing arts) which re-
quires personal qualifications to be met by the "person" engaged in
such a profession.'3 The rule is of significant importance for a health
service plan because of the desirability of utilizing the corporate form
for liability and tax purposes rather than the unincorporated association
form. Although the rule is generally stated without regard to whether
the corporation is a profit or nonprofit corporation, it is important to
note that no court has yet held a nonprofit corporation operating a
health service plan to be in violation of the corporate practice rule.
There is, however, at least one jurisdiction in which there is consider-
able doubt as to whether the problem would be resolved in favor of
the use of the nonprofit corporate form.' 4
9. 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
10. WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 22. For a more extensive discussion of these cases and
medical society disciplinary actions see, The American Medical Association: Power Pur-
pose and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 938, 988-92 (1954).
11. See supra note 7, at 37-42.
12. See, e.g., New Kensington Group Wins Long Fight to Admit its Physicians to
Hospital Staff, Group Health and Welfare News (Nov. 1967).
13. 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONs, 397 (1963). This is
the general rule supported by the weight of authority. For a general discussion of the
corporate practice rule see Hansen, supra note 2, at 211-19; see also Note, Group Health
Plans: Some Legal and Economic Aspects, 53 YALE L.J. 162, 166-71 (1943); Laufer, Ethical
and Legal Restrictions on Contract and Corporate Practice of Medicine, 6 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROB. 517, 522-27 (1939).
14. 1963 OHIO ATr'y GEN. REP. No. 82. "It has been well settled in Ohio that a corpora-




State insurance laws present another possible obstacle to the opera-
tion of a prepayment health service plan since such acts ordinarily
require a large reserve fund to be maintained by the insuring group
to cover liability contingencies. The weight of authority, however,
holds that such plans are not providing insurance, but rather are in
the business of providing services, namely, medical care, rather than
indemnifying against a loss in the traditional sense of insurance.1 5 The
distinction is made between the indemnification for services rendered
(insurance) and the assurance that the services will be rendered (pre-
paid health plans).' 6
The matter discussed above was intended to give the reader an his-
torical view of the development of prepaid health care plans and to
show the extent of the problems involved in forming and operating
such plans. But the corporate practice rule, medical society disciplinary
actions, and the possible application of the insurance laws are not the
major obstacles today to the formation of consumer sponsored and
controlled plans. Restrictive enabling acts are the major obstacle to
such plans. A restricting enabling act is an act which restricts the con-
trol of the financial aspects of the plan to the health care professions,
which in most instances is the medical profession. In effect it means that
no one but the health care professions and their members can originate
and operate a prepayment health care plan. The constitutional validity
of these acts will now be investigated.
RESTRICTIVE AcTs
The restrictive acts can be divided into four basic categories as they
are found in the enabling acts. There are those acts which contain pro-
visions requiring medical society approval of the articles of incorpora-
tion, 17 medical society sponsorship or control over the directors or
trustees of the plans,' 8 and those acts which require actual medical
15. Group Health Association v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D.C. Cir. 1938), aff'd sub-nom,
Jordon v. Group Health Association, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Group Health Co-
operative of Puget Sound v. King Medical Society, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951);
Complete Service Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Society, 43 Cal. 2d 201, 272 P.2d
497 (1954); cf., Cleveland Hospital Service Association v. Ebright, 36 Ohio L. Abs. 600,
45 N.E.2d 157 (Ohio App. 1942), affd, 142 Ohio St. 51, 49 N.E.2d 929 (1943); see also, 167
A.L.R. 323; 29 AM. JuR. INSURANCE § 12 (1940).
16. Hansen, Legal Problems in the Organization and Operation of Group Health Plans,
5 VAND. L. REv. 14, 22 (1951); Hansen, supra note 2 at 219-20; Hansen, 42 MINN. L. REv.
537 (1958); MacColl, GROUP PRACTICE AND PREPAYMENT OF MEDICAL CARE, 159-61 (1966).
17. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 27-20-1 et seq. (1945).
18. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1801 et seq. (1960); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 550.301 et seq. (1957);
N.H. REv. STAT. § 420 (1943); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1101 et seq. (1962).
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society control. 19 There are also provisions found in some enabling acts
requiring a certain percentage of the physicians in a locality to become
members of the plan.20 Other acts permit all physicians to become
participating members of the plan, and require that the corporation or
plan itself cannot exclude these physicians if they, the physicians, so
desire to join.21 In many enabling acts of a restrictive nature a basic prin-
ciple of the American Medical Association Code of Ethics is incorpo-
rated as a provision of the act requiring that free choice of physician
by a subscriber of the plan be maintained at all times, even though the
particular physician chosen by the subscriber is not a participating
member of the plan.22 There are also requirements in some acts which
do not necessarily make them restrictive but which have a restrictive
nature which require surplus or contingency funds to be maintained
by the plan either prior to commencement of business or while busi-
ness is being conducted and in many instances in both cases. 23 These
amounts vary greatly and it is basically the amount required under the
act which determines whether the provision is restrictive or not. As to
the latter of these restrictive features, it may be noted that there are
various valid reasons for requiring such contingency and surplus funds.
These plans are closely aligned to insurance, and the insurance laws do
require contingency or liability funds to be maintained by insurance
companies.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In 1963 and 1964, two decisions of great significance concerning re-
strictive enabling acts were decided in New Jersey. The initial case,
Group Health Insurance of N.J. v. Howell,24 decided that section two
of the New Jersey Medical Service Corporation Law was unconstitu-
tional. Section 2 stated:
No person shall be elected a trustee of any medical service corpora-
tion unless his nomination has been approved by a recognized
medical society or professional medical organization having not
less than two thousand members holding licenses to practice medi-
cine and surgery pursuant to Chapter Nine, Title 45, of the Re-
19. The medical society must approve the plan before it can operate in a particular
locality. See, GA. CODE ANN., § 56-1801 et seq. (1960). TENN. CODE ANN., Ch. 29, § 56-2901
et seq. (1945).
20. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. Ch. 420 (1943).
21. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 696.010 et seq. (1963).
22. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 21.20.140 et seq. (1966).
23. Id.
24. 40 N.J. 436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963).
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vised Statutes, and which has been incorporated for a period of not
less than ten years.2 5
It was held that this section constituted a delegation of legislative power
to a private organization without adequate legislative standards or safe-
guards in derogation of Article 4 Section 1 of the New Jersey Consti-
tution, 26 and, further, that the unfairness, arbitrariness, and favoritism
of the section was a violation of due process. 27 The court pointed out in
its opinion that the medical society was the only organization which
met these necessary requirements. 28
Section 3 of the same act required that 51% of the physicians in any
county must be participating physicians before any corporation could
be certified to transact business in that county. 29 The constitutionality
of this particular section was not decided until the second Group Health
Insurance case, 30 decided in 1964. There, the court held that this sec-
tion was so unreasonable that it constituted an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power or authority to a private organization, as
well as being violative of due process.31 The court stated that the 51%
requirement permits the physicians to prohibit any other plan from
coming into existence.32
Earlier, in 1960, the Illinois Supreme Court decided Illinois Hospital
Service, Inc. v. Gerber.3 This case was not concerned with prepaid
health services, but rather with prepaid hospital services, commonly
known as "Blue Cross" plans. Section 14 of the Illinois "Blue Cross"
enabling act prohibited a hospital service plan from operating in any
county unless it had contracts with hospitals "which operate not less
than thirty per cent (30%) of the total number of general hospital beds
which normally serve the residents of said County."' 4 The court held
the section to be unconstitutional under the Illinois Constitution due
process provision.35 The reasoning was similar to that of the New
Jersey court in that the court could find no public purpose in placing
25. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48A-2 (1940).
26. "The legislative power shall be vested in a Senate and General Assembly."
27. 40 N.J. at 444, 193 A.2d at 109 (1963).
28. 40 N.J. at 443, 193 A.2d at 108 (1963).
29. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48A-3 (1940).
30. Group Health Insurance of N.J. v. Howell, 43 N.J. 104, 202 A.2d 689 (1964).
31. Id. at 109, 202 A.2d at 693.
32. Id.
33. 18 Ill. 2d 531, 165 N.E.2d 279 (1960).
34. ILL. STAT. ANN., Ch. 32, § 562b (1959), repealed by Act of Aug. 24, 1965.
35. ILL. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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in the hands of private groups the power of determining whether a
hospital service plan should operate in a county.8 6 The court also stated
that the lack of any standards being placed upon the exercise of this
power rendered the section violative of due process.8 7 The court further
stated:
If dominion over the economic life of one individual or enter-
prise is to be given to another, some justification must exist and the
conditions upon which control is to be exercised must be stated
with at least that degree of precision which is required when com-
parable authority is given to a public official .... 38
While the reasoning of the court is a helpful analogy to declaring some
restrictive provisions of prepaid health service plan enabling acts un-
constitutional, the import of the Illinois decision is tempered by the
fact that it appears that the court's real reason for declaring the pro-
vision unconstitutional was the fact that the Illinois Hospital Associa-
tion had formulated a policy that only one "Blue Cross" plan should
operate in any given area, and that this policy should be carried out by
each member hospital having a contract with only one "Blue Cross"
plan.3 9 The court reached an equitable result, but probably not upon
the proper basis.
Nevertheless, the three decisions taken together, and the two New
Jersey opinions in particular, constitute a significant development in
the area of prepaid health programs because they constitute the initial
thrust of court action in piercing the protective shield placed around
medical society control of prepaid health services and programs. Before
further analysis is pursued on this subject, it is important to reiterate
that the opposition to these restrictive enabling acts stems from the
medical society control of the financial aspects of the health services,
and not with the method or manner of providing these services. It is
readily acknowledged that the means and the manner in which the
actual health services are provided are and should be solely within the
province of the professional personnel qualified to render the services.
The consumer is not desirous of controlling the medical aspects of the
plans, but rather tle economic aspects of the plan.
36. 18 Ill. 2d 535, 165 N.E.2d 283 (1960).
37. Id.
38. Id.
59. Id. at 534, 165 N.E.2d 282.
132
Vol. 7: 125, 1968
Comments
DELEGATION AND DUE PROCESS
The two concepts employed by the New Jersey Court to invalidate
the restriction provisions of the New Jersey Act, viz., the unlawful dele-
gation of legislative authority to a private body, and the due process
requirements of the state and federal constitution will now be analyzed
to determine their possible affect on other restrictive enabling acts.
The delegation doctrine is a judicially established concept derived
from provisions found in the federal and state constitutions that the
legislative power is vested in the legislature. Actually the doctrine is a
misnomer today, for it is admitted by most authorities, and some courts,
that legislative powers can be delegated to public and private groups; 40
the real reason why such delegations are declared unconstitutional is
because the legislature has failed to provide adequate standards or safe-
guards to accompany the exercise of power delegated.
This reasoning has led some writers to regard the question of dele-
gation as a question of reasonableness, and therefore equivalent to a
due process requirement.41 There appears to be some validity in this
statement if one views the cases decided in the two areas by the Supreme
Court of the United States and the state courts.
In the earlier part of the Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court of
the United States appeared to be laying a patchwork pattern as far as
the delegation doctrine and private bodies was concerned. In the period
from 1905 to 1917 the Supreme Court decided three cases of significant
importance regarding alleged delegation of legislative authority to a
private body; all three delegations were found to be constitutional. 42
Yet, during this period the Supreme Court, in Eubank v. City of Rich-
mond,43 held invalid an ordinance delegating to certain neighboring
property owners the authority to determine how far buildings should
be set back from the street. Then, in 1928, the Court held invalid an
ordinance prohibiting an old person's home in an area without the
consent of a certain portion of the neighboring persons.4 4 In 1936, the
now infamous case of Carter v. Carter Coal Co.45 was decided in which
40. U.S. v. Dettra Flag Co., 86 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Pa. 1949). 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw, §§ 2.14, 2.15 (1958); Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REv. 201
(1937); Note, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1398 (1954).
41. Jaffe, supra note 40, and 67 HARV. L. REv,. supra note 40.
42. Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1905); St. Louis & Iron Mountain
Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281 (1908); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526
(1917).
43. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
44. State of Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
45. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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the Court held invalid the Congressional delegation of authority to a
percentage of the employers and employees in the mining industry of
the power to fix wages. Since 1936 the Supreme Court has been ex-
tremely reluctant to declare any kind of delegation unconstitutional. 46
With this in mind, it becomes very interesting to note that at ap-
proximately the same time the Supreme Court of the United States
adopted a new position as to the effect of the due process clause on state
legislation regulating business or economic matters.
In 1937, one year after the Carter case, the Supreme Court decided
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish47 which is considered the watershed for
the abandonment of the concept of substantive due process in the area
of economic regulations and the adoption of a "hands-off" position by
the Supreme Court. 48 Prior to this time the Supreme Court had re-
quired that there exist a real and substantial nexus between the means
employed by the legislature to control economic measures and the con-
stitutional objectives sought. In effect, the Supreme Court was imposing
its own concepts of economic policies upon the legislatures through the
due process clause. The new position which began in 1937, and exists
today, can best be shown by the Court's own statement in Ferguson v.
Skrupa49 which was decided in 1963:
We refuse to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legis-
lation," and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when
courts used the Due Process Clause "to strike down state laws,
regulation of business and industrial conditions, because they may
be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school
of thought."50
From these decisions it is clear that the Supreme Court of the United
States has abdicated the field of economic regulation to the state legis-
latures as far as due process and the delegation doctrine are concerned.
Unless there is no rational basis for the legislature's action, it is doubt-
ful that the Supreme Court will invalidate the enactment and conse-
quently it is doubtful that they would act in the area under considera-
tion.
46. For an example of the extent to which the Supreme Court has gone in holding
delegations valid see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), decree entered, 376 U.S.
340 (1964), in which a broad delegation of authority was granted to a public official
without any guiding standards set by the legislature.
47. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
48. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 S. CT. REv. 34.
49. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
50. Id. at 731-2 (footnotes omitted).
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However, all state courts did not follow the precedents established by
the United States Supreme Court on either the delegation or the due
process issue. Many state courts still adhere to the substantive due pro-
cess concept in the area of economic regulations and require a real and
substantial nexus to exist between the restrictions imposed by the
statute or ordinance and the objective to be obtained.51 By these courts
retaining the concept of substantive due process they have placed them-
selves in the position of being the final determinant of state public
policy in the area of economic and social regulation and development.
It is in these states that it is most likely that a state court would find
the restrictive enabling act to be unconstitutional. A court may well
feel that the economic or financial control of such plans should not be
limited to doctor or medical society control, but rather that others, pri-
marily consumers, should also be able to enter this field and thereby
increase competition.
The state court's application of the non-delegation doctrine is con-
flicting to say the least. Although it is apparent that most state courts
still adhere to the doctrine (in name if nothing else) it is unclear as to
their reasons for applying it in this area. Perhaps the best statement of
the subject is found in United States v. Dettra Flag Co.52 where the
court said:
Many [states] allow delegation of administrative duties to private
individuals or corporations when the delegation is under the police
power of the state to regulate for the health, safety and welfare of
the people. Those statutes which were declared unconstitutional
were invalid not necessarily because they involved delegations to
private groups, but because they failed to establish definite stan-
dards to be followed, because the penalty to be imposed was op-
tional upon private determination, or because the statute permitted
arbitrary discrimination among interested parties5 3
This last reason stated by the court in Dettra, the possibility of
arbitrary discrimination among interested parties, is the type of pro-
51. See, Frecker v. City of Dayton, 153 Ohio St. 14, 90 N.E.2d 851 (1950); City of
Scottsbluff v. Winters Creek Canal Co., 155 Neb. 723, 53 N.W.2d 543 (1952); Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh, 246 Iowa 9, 65 N.W.2d 410 (1954); Cott Beverage Corp. v.
Horst, 380 Pa. 113, 110 A.2d 405 (1955); Trinka Services, Inc. v. State Board of Mortuary
Science, 40 N.J. Super. 238, 122 A.2d 668 (1956). Cf., Anchor Hocking Glass Corp. v. Barber,
118 Vt. 206, 105 A.2d 271 (1954); People v. Ryan, 101 Cal. App. 2d 927, 226 P.2d 376 (1951);
Dayton Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Fl. D. Union, 229 Minn. 87, 39 N.W.2d 183
(1949).
52. 86 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
53. Id. at 89-90.
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vision found in the first New Jersey Group Health case,5 4 as well as in
Fink v. Cole55 and Union Trust Co. v. Simmons,"6 the two principal
cases relied upon by the New Jersey Court when invalidating the New.
Jersey statute.
ANALYSIS
Regardless of the position that one believes the Court should take
in viewing state economic regulations, an act which grants to a private
body the power to regulate the economic posture of another, whenever
that first party is an interested party to the outcome and is unbridled
by legislative standards, safeguards or public responsibility, the delega-
tion should be stricken as being unreasonable and an unconstitutional
delegation of power. The legislature is, in effect, transposing the private
well being and purposes of the medical professions for the public wel-
fare. Therefore, those restrictive acts which grant to the medical so-
cieties the power to approve the plan, 57 or its articles of incorporation,58
or a majority of its directors or trustees,5 9 should be declared invalid.
The other types of restrictive provisions do not present the same
type of objections. Those acts requiring a percentage of participating
physicians or free choice of physician by a subscriber, or the right of
every doctor in the state or locality to join the plan, must be tested on
due process requirements rather than on the non-delegation theory.60
From the foregoing analysis of due process it is extremely doubtful
that either the United States Supreme Court or those state courts ad-
hering to the Supreme Court's position on economic due process would
hold invalid such acts. It is even doubtful that those state courts espous-
ing the substantive due process concept would hold some of these re-
strictive provisions invalid because there are valid reasons for requiring
a certain quantity of physicians to be associated with the plan since this
insures better service. Also, free choice of physician, whether participat-
ing or not, theoretically provides the potentiality for better service to
the subscriber. Probably the most vulnerable restrictive provisions are
54. 40 N.J. 436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963).
55. 302 N.Y. 216, 97 N.E.2d 873 (1951).
56. 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190 (1949).
57. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1801 et seq. (1960). TENN. CODE ANN., Ch. 29, § 56-2901 et seq.
(1966).
58. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-20-1 et seq. (1945).
59. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1801 et seq. (1960); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 550.301 et seq. (1957);
N.H. REV. STAT. § 420 (1943); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1101 et seq. (1962).
60. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. Ch. 420 (1943); NEV. REV. STAT. § 696.010 et seq. (1963);
ALAsKA STAT. § 21.20.140 et seq. (1966).
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those which require such a high quantity of physicians so as to clearly
preclude any other plan (other than a doctor-sponsored plan) from
operating in the state, and those acts giving every doctor the right to
join the plan since such a requirement appears to be aimed at the
benefit of the physician rather than the subscriber or public.
If change is to be effectuated in this area to permit consumer spon-
sored plans to exist as readily as doctor sponsored plans, the initiative
and efforts are probably going to have to be exercised upon the legis-
latures rather than in the courts, since most of the power of regulation
of such activity still remains within the province of the legislature.
CONCLUSION
The two New Jersey decisions declaring invalid and unconstitutional
the restrictive features of New Jersey's prepaid health service plan
enabling act were a forward thrust in penetrating the shield placed
around any type of competition in this area. But the lapse of time since
these decisions indicates that the courts are not going to be the cham-
pion in altering the medical profession's monopolistic hold on pre-
payment health care plans. Competition is a basic tenet of American
society and philosophy. There was and is no valid public purpose in
competely thwarting competition in this area. It is unfortunate that
the remedy lies within the province of the legislatures, for the chances
that the legislatures will act to change these restrictive acts to make
them open to consumer sponsorship and control is unlikely. It would
be unfortunate to require society to await the massing of opposing
pressure groups to counterbalance the influence of the health profes-
sions, but such is the only apparent alternative open at this time.
JOHN M. CAMPFIELD
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